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The EU and Russia: A New Foreign Policy for the 
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Without any irony: the decision of High 
Representative (HR) Borrell to go to Moscow 
in early February was courageous and correct. 
The discussion on EU-Russia relations at the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 22 February 
and the conclusions of that meeting were a 
success. But that does not mean that the EU 
should not drastically improve its foreign 
policy game. 
 
On the visit: The relations between the EU and 
Russia were not brilliant even before 2014 but 
came to a complete standstill after the annexation 
of Crimea and the Russian interference in Eastern 
Ukraine. It was laudable of HR Borrell to attempt 
to explore possibilities for gradually thawing the 
frozen relationship in a face-to-face meeting with 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. He did not 
merit the undiplomatic reception he received. 
 
On the FAC: EU Member States are dramatically 
divided on Russia, and it was Lavrov’s intention 
to deepen the split further. He did not succeed: 
the Council unanimously condemned the Russian 
attitude and the way the Navalny affair has been 
handled, and agreed on additional sanctions. 
However weak these measures may seem, the 
fact that they were adopted unanimously proves 
that within the EU there still is a willingness to 
develop a common foreign policy. Even on what 
is perhaps its most difficult relationship. 
 
However, let us not overdo the self-
congratulation. The events of 5 February are 
important, not so much because of the rude way 
in which Lavrov slammed the door in Borrell’s 
face, but more because (once more) Russia put 
the finger on one of the constituent weaknesses 
of the EU: its foreign policy. Russian diplomacy 
knows the EU construction very well – in 
particular the ambiguities in the distribution of 
competences between the Union and its 
Member States.  
 
It is in itself a small miracle that the common 
position on Russia decided in 2014, under the 
emotional pressure of the MH-17 disaster, and 
the Five Guiding Principles of March 2016 have 
been reiterated without much discussion every 6 
months since then, and have been accompanied 
by a progressively stricter sanctions regime. The 
divergences between Member States have 
 
 





however rendered any substantive discussion on 
Russia impossible. Perhaps the sanctions can be 
prolonged so easily, though, because they do not 
really “bite”, nor do they hinder Member States 
in the further development of economic 
relations with Russia. 
 
Where do we stand with the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), taking into account 
the discussions during the last FAC? One can 
either take pride in what has been accomplished 
since 1993, or one can deplore how little we 
have achieved. Perhaps the discussion needs to 
be pushed to a different level: is a common 
foreign policy überhaupt possible in the present 
EU configuration, and what does the 
development of an effective CFSP require? 
 
EU INTEGRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY  
To understand the shortcomings of CFSP, it is 
useful to compare it with economic integration 
in the EEC/EU since the 1950s. 
 
CFSP was born 1993 and fast developed its own 
institutional dynamics, formalised in the 
successive Treaties: creation of the High 
Representative, the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), and the diplomatic 
service (EEAS). The institutional development 
is remarkable. The problem is that substantive 
foreign policy positions and actions did not 
follow the institutional development. Creating 
institutions and mechanisms is not enough to 
generate a common foreign policy. Something 
else is needed. 
 
The intentions behind the CFSP were laudable 
and reflected the lessons of the early 1950s. With 
the failure of the Defence Community and the 
Political Community, the founding fathers had 
understood that Member States were not ripe 
for political integration. They decided to 
proceed with economic integration, counting on 
the economic “approximation” of the Member 
States to lead to political integration. 
Institutionally, this is what happened. In the 
early 1990s the time seemed ripe, but the 
political leaders underestimated (or 
misunderstood) the difference between the 
mechanisms of economic and political 
integration. 
 
European integration was launched as a political 
project (“ever closer Europe”), but with an 
economic starting point: the Common Market.  
The Customs Union is not based on political 
idealism but on down-to-earth economic 
interests. The negotiating economists and 
officials understood very well that the process of 
economic integration is a balancing act between 
gains and losses: by opening borders a country 
will lose its less competitive industries, but its 
efficient industries will gain an expanded 
market. As long as the gains outweigh the losses, 
the integration process proceeds; it is a positive-
sum-game. The driving force behind integration 
is not an idealistic common good, but well-
understood self-interest.  The outcome of the 
balancing of gains and losses is consolidated in 
a binding legal basis that allows the integration 
process to proceed. Whenever problems arise, 
an additional legal base is created, reinforcing 
the common legal framework of the economic 
Union. This strong internal legal base and the 
common interest in the existing arrangements 
together create a firm basis for the external 
representation of the EU, whenever an 
international negotiation takes place on an issue 
covered by the internal market. Occasionally, 
conflicts of interests between Member States 
may arise, but the principle is clear (art 3.2 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). 
 
The situation is quite different for CFSP/CSDP. 
Whereas in economic integration, the 
institutions developed as and when substantive 
 
 





economic integration required it, in CFSP the 
institutions were created in the hope that the 
integration of foreign policy would follow. The 
legal base of CFSP is weak, and countries 
continue to pursue their national interests. The 
give-and-take and the balancing of gains and 
losses that in economic integration leads to 
constructive compromises, is much more 
difficult to realise in foreign policy. Decision-
making requires unanimity and Member States 
have not yet recognised that there is a common 
EU interest, and how it can be realised as a result 
of the positive-sum game. It is an illusion to 
believe that at this stage Qualified Majority 
Voting would improve the situation. It would 
only lead to more severe conflicts with Member 
States that feel side-lined by the decisions taken. 
 
NATIONAL VS EUROPEAN PRIORITIES 
The political interests of the Member States and 
their diplomatic relations are determined by 
economic, geographic, historical, religious, 
cultural and other factors. Member States have 
different priorities, and the balancing between 
economic interests and values is different in 
each country. This is obvious when looking at 
their security priorities: many Central European 
countries that spent decades under Soviet rule 
see Russia as the reincarnation of the “evil 
empire”. Not so the Southern European 
countries: they consider the trans-Mediterranean 
migration flows as the main security risk – 
unlike, in turn, the more Northern Member 
States. France is worried by the surge in 
fundamentalist Islam in the Sahel; many other 
Member States could not care less. The Treaty 
does not provide a compulsory framework for 
defining a single policy. As a result, every 
country continues to pursue its own objectives 
and priorities. 
 
For international economic relations, the EU is 
important as it provides the framework for 
Member States’ trade, investment, etc. This 
common framework (the Common External 
Tariff, the Common Trade Policy) is, just like 
the Common Market, the result of balancing 
gains and losses. The common framework 
negotiated with any partner country (or 
organisation) is in the first place a common 
denominator of the interests of the Member 
States. For every Member State this implies a 
“give and take”: you lose something as the 
opening of trade competes with your national 
products, but lower barriers to trade for other 
sectors allows your industry to expand. It is 
again the positive-sum game approach that allow 
trade negotiators to conclude trade agreements. 
 
But what happens if there is no clear balance 
between gains and losses, like in foreign policy? 
 
A country’s national policy reflects its interests 
in relations with the rest of the world, modulated 
to some extend by its values. Consolidating this 
policy in a supranational context is only 
interesting if supranational decision-making 
coincides with the national interest. In that case 
the country’s policy priorities and interests are 
re-enforced as a greater group of countries will 
support it. 
 
But why would a country give up its own policy 
priorities and dilute its “interests” if it gets 
nothing in return? Foreign policy coordination 
is to a large extent a zero-sum game. Germany 
focuses on its short-term interests, and feels it 
would not gain anything by aligning itself with a 
joint EU position and limit its economic 
relations with Russia. The prospect of a boost in 
economic relations after an eventual 
normalisation of EU-Russia relations is 
perceived as far too hypothetical. The Baltic 
States are of the opinion that they would gain 
nothing by aligning themselves with a more 
open economic cooperation with Russia. In this 
 
 





situation, a common EU position can only be a 
compromise and will result in an ambivalent text 
with wording that papers over the conflicting 
ambitions of the Member States. Thus no 
effective EU policy can emerge. Exceptional 
moments do exist, when emotions run high and 
pressure mounts to show the coherence of the 
Union, but these are rare. 
 
 
Harmonization of foreign relations over a broad 
range of topics, allowing Member States to 
compute losses and gains over many dossiers so 
as to enable a positive-sum game, is extremely 
complex and has not been tried. Imagine the 
following question: what foreign policy gain 
would convince the Baltic States to agree with a 
more positive approach to Russia? 
 
The result: on all issues the EU can only adopt 
the lowest common denominator position. As 
Lavrov once told me: “The EU moves at the 
speed of the slowest camel”. 
 
ADDITIONAL WEAKNESSES 
Simplifying matters, let us assume that a 
country’s foreign policy aims at promoting its 
interests while taking into account to some 
degree its fundamental values. 
 
In the EU, there is a convenient division of 
labour. For EU diplomacy, the emphasis is on 
values: democracy, respect for human rights, 
sustainable development, etc. The interests 
(trade, investment, other forms of economic and 
scientific cooperation, etc.) are the realm of the 
Member States. This does not mean that 
Member States ignore the value aspect, but the 
balance between values and interests is 
obviously biased in favour of the economic 
interests. Keeping the dialogue going in a 
situation of conflict is a valid point, but the 
question is how far this argument can be 
stretched.  Partner countries know this and 
skilfully play self-interested Member States off 
against a too activist EU. The recent debacle of 
Borrell’s visit to Moscow is a prime example: 
Borrell could not but raise the problems around 
the Navalny affair. Lavrov, knowing that some 
Member States did not consider this a breaking 
point for important economic projects, 
dismissed the issue and indulged in trying to 
further split the EU. This intra-EU divide allows 
Russia to continue to develop its relations with 
Russia-friendly Member States.  In view of this 
interest-values split, no fully-fledged EU foreign 
policy can be formulated. 
 
Apart from development cooperation with 
certain groups of developing countries, and 
financial and technical cooperation with 
Neighbouring Countries and Candidate 
Countries, the EU is only marginally active in 
concrete economic cooperation activities. The 
main role of the EU institutions is to negotiate 
and conclude the framework for the economic 
cooperation activities of the Member States: 
trade, investment, visa arrangement (Schengen), 
etc. Once the negotiation is finished and the 
framework exists, the EU becomes to some 
extent irrelevant, because the reality of relations 
(i.e. their implementation in the form of 
investment or trade decisions) resides with the 
Member States. Lavrov called the EU a 
“carcass”. His spokesperson later said the 
translation was wrong: in fact, the Minister 
meant to say “framework”. But this is exactly the 
point: the EU is nothing but a framework.  
 
This brings us back to where we started. What 
Lavrov’s intervention made very clear is that for 
Russia, the Union is an obstacle to good 
relations with the Member States. The Union 
focusses exclusively on values: shortcomings of 
democracy and human rights in Russia, 
epitomised at this moment by Navalny and the 
 
 





protest movement. The EU can only offer 
criticism and insist that respect for human rights 
is a condition for the relaunching of relations. 
 
Member states focus in the first place on 
ongoing or potential economic relations. They 
do insist on values, but that is a non-binding 
criticism that does not stop them from 
proceeding with mutually beneficial economic 
projects. Moreover, as already indicated, the EU 
has nothing to offer at this stage. The EU has 
made itself irrelevant since 2014: what the EU 
does, is negotiating cooperation frameworks; by 
suspending these negotiations, hardly anything 
is left for the Union to do with Russia. 
Therefore, no harm is done by removing the 
“carcass”. The EU is an inconvenient 
impediment as the slow-moving (or immobile) 
“camels” only hinder the movement of the 
“camels” that want to proceed with fruitful 
cooperation. 
 
A WAY FORWARD? 
The only way forward is for the Union to define 
a CFSP that is solidly based on shared values and 
common interests. At present, however, there is 
some slippage on the side of the common 
values, while interests are far from common and 
probably diverging. This does not necessarily 
mean that there is no scope for advancing CFSP. 
Indeed, the unanimous decisions of the 22 
February FAC show that Member States can still 
reach a common position in the face of an 
external insult, not to say threat. Ironically, 
Russia might have saved  CFSP, in the same way 
as the threat of the Soviet Union contributed to 
the European integration process in the 1950s. 
The security and defence issues between Russia 
and the EU may well be the starting point of a 
new approach. 
 
Capitalising on this (modest) positive signal, a 
constructive way forward could be mapped out, 
based on the previously identified obstacles and 
ambiguities that hinder the development of a 
genuinely European CFSP. 
 
First, it is necessary to find ways and means to 
break the zero-sum logic that freezes the 
positions of Member States. All the respective 
threats perceived by various groups of Member 
States are real and deserve attention. The 
November 2020 common threat analysis 
undertaken in the context of the drafting of a 
“Strategic Compass”, combining information 
from the Intelligence Services of the Member 
States, is a crucial first step. This exercise should 
not stop there. Member States should be 
encouraged to actively support each other in 
coping with their respective security threats. 
This could be the beginning of a positive sum 
game dynamic, in which Member States 
understand that security threats should not be 
handled piecemeal but as a whole. Moreover, by 
giving up an exclusive focus on their own 
security problem they can receive substantive 
support from other Member States. Rather than 
look for protection under the NATO umbrella, 
increasingly Member States should look for 
collaboration and protection in the CSDP 
context. CSDP could be an important element 
in realising the “positive-sum game” of CFSP 
(strategic autonomy). Admittedly this is easier 
said than done, but competent diplomats and 
security specialists can certainly identify 
complementary diplomatic, military and other 
actions that Member States could undertake, and 
thus, taking a leave out of the book of trade 
negotiations, gradually construct a give-and-take 
approach and balance gains and losses. 
 
Second, the dichotomy must be ended between 
the EU taking care of values and Member States 
taking care of their interests. The way out is to 
set up a mechanism for screening major outward 
investments from Member States’ companies in 
 
 





the same manner as inward investment is 
screened. The EU Foreign Investment 
Screening Mechanism became operational in 
October 2020. A screening mechanism for 
inward investment ensures the integrity of the 
internal market. A screening mechanism for 
outward investment could also ensure the 
integrity of the internal market and its coherence 
with the political and the economic interests of 
the EU. The experience of setting up the inward 
Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism can 
inspire the setting up of an outward counterpart. 
The introduction of such a mechanism would 
also resolve the limitations in the role of the EU 
institutions, which would no longer be restricted 
to a negotiating role but would actively monitor 
the application, not only of trade agreements but 






The stronger the pressure and perceived 
aggressiveness from Russia (and from China), 
the greater the chance that a genuine CFSP will 
successfully emerge.  
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